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Abstract
In this note we show that the measure of intensity of downside risk
aversion proposed recently by Crainich and Eeckhoudt (2007) cannot be
guaranteed to exist. We do this by means of an example in which the
existence of the measure depends upon the values of the parameters in
the problem.
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11I n t r o d u c t i o n
The issue of downside risk aversion has been subject to a fair amount of study
lately. One particular issue that has proven to me of importance is the measure
of the intensity of downside risk aversion, that is, the study of the utility char-
acteristics that diﬀerentiate between individuals according to who is the more
downside risk averse. To that end, in a recent paper Crainich and Eeckhoudt
(2007), from now on CE, have proposed that the ratio of the third derivative
of utility to the ﬁrst derivative captures the intensity of downside risk aversion.
While this particular mesaure is not new to the literature (see Menezes et al.
(1980) for the seminal paper in which this measure is mentioned, and also Mod-
ica and Scarsini (2005)), the manner in which CE derive the measure is novel.
However, as we shall show in this note, there is no guarantee that the method
proposed by CE actually works generally.
1.1 A quick overview of downside risk aversion
Consider two lotteries: the ﬁrst one (the primary risk) gives a one-half chance
of the loss of k>0 (the “downside”) and a one-half chance of a gain of 0 (the
“upside”); the second lottery is deﬁned by a random variable e ε with zero mean
Ee ε =0(the secondary risk), and it can be placed either on the “upside” or the
“downside” of the ﬁrst risk. Then:















Eu(x − k +e ε).
2where x is the initial wealth.
We assume that marginal utility is convex (i.e. u000 > 0). From Jensen’s
inequality for any strictly convex function v and any random variable e y we
know that v(Ee y) <E v (e y).U s i n gv = u0 and the random variable e y = w +e ε
we get:
u0(w)=u0(w + Ee ε)=u0(E(w +e ε)) ≤ Eu0(w +e ε)= ⇒ Eu0(w +e ε) − u0(w) ≥ 0
which implies that J(w)=Eu(w + e ε) − u(w) is an increasing function in w.











that is, EU (the expected utility of having e ε on the upside) is always greater
than ED (the expected utility of having it on the downside), situation called
downside risk aversion.
In order to measure the intensity of downside risk aversion in terms of the
shape of the utility function u, CE place the zero mean lottery on the less
preferred downside of the primary lottery, but then introduce a compensation
g i v e nb ya na m o u n to fm o n e y( m) received in the upside of the primary lottery,
such that the decision maker is indiﬀerent to having the zero mean risk placed












Eu(x − k +e ε)
Then using a second-order Taylor expansion, CE show that m can be ex-
pressed as a function of u000
u0 , and therefore u000
u0 can be taken as being a measure
3of the intensity of downside risk aversion, since the greater is u000
u0 ,t h eg r e a t e r
would have to be the upside compensation, m, for having the risk located on
the downside.
2 A problem with this approach
The CE approach has been criticised in the literature. For example, Keenan
and Snow (2009) note that an increase in the intensity measure proposed by CE
is “neither necessary nor suﬃcient for greater downside risk aversion, whether
for small or large changes in risk preference.” Here we shall concentrate on a
separate issue, related to the very existence of the compensation proposed by
CE.
Although EU is greater than ED and introducing the compensation m we
can always increase the value of ED(m)=1
2u(x+m)+1
2Eu(x−k+e ε),i ti sn o t
clear that the curve ED(m) can always reach the value EU.T h ec u r v eED(m)
starts from an initial value ED(0) <E U,a n dED(m) is an increasing, concave
function, but it is possible (as we will see) that ED(m) never reaches the value
EU,e v e nf o ri n ﬁnite compensation levels.
We only need a counter-example to prove this result. To that end, let us
consider the typical CARA utility function:
u(w)=C − αe−ρw




4Let us also consider the uniform random variable e ε deﬁned by the density func-
tion f(ε)=1
2 over the interval [−1,1]. Clearly, this is a zero mean random
variable.



























T h eu p s i d eo ft h ep r i m a r yl o t t e r yi st h ec a s ei nw h i c hw = x,w h i l et h e





















(e−ρ − eρ) − eρk]
On the other hand, placing the zero mean lottery on the downside of the




































e−ρx[e−ρm − eρk +
1
2ρ
(e−ρ − eρ)(1 − eρk)]
In consequence, the sign of EU −ED(m) is given by the sign of the function:
R(m)=e−ρm − eρk +
1
2ρ
(e−ρ − eρ)(1 − eρk).
We are looking for a level of compensation, say b m,s u c ht h a tEU −ED(b m)=0 ,
which is the same as saying that we are searching for b m such that R(b m)=0 .
If no compensation is given, m =0 , then we should expect that R>0,
that is placing the zero mean risk on the upside is better than placing it on the
downside. This can be conﬁrmed by noting that:
R(0) = 1 − eρk +
1
2ρ
(e−ρ − eρ)(1 − eρk)




But since G(ρ)=e−ρ −eρ is concave (G00(ρ)=G(ρ) < 0) and decreasing, we
have:







Since for any positive number ρk we have 1 −eρk < 0, it turns out that R(0) is
the product of two negative numbers, and so as expected we have R(0) > 0.
6It also happens that
R0(m)=−ρe−ρm < 0
R00(m)=ρ2e−ρm > 0
that is R(m) is decreasing and convex in m. Thus, considering only non-negative
values of m, we know that R(m) starts oﬀ positive, and then decreases but at a
diminishing rate. It is not clear that such a function will always reach a value
of 0.
If the function were to reach a value of 0 for some m,t h e ni tw o u l db e





(e−ρ − eρ)(1 − eρk) ≡ H(ρ,k).
The existence of a value b m such that R(b m)=0 depends on the sign of
H(ρ,k).
But H(ρ,k) can be positive or negative depending on the values of ρ and k.
For example, taking k =1we get:
H(ρ,1) = −eρ +
1
2ρ
(e−ρ − eρ)(1 − eρ)
The graph of this function is shown in Figure 1 (H(ρ,1) = 0 for ρ =1 .36):










In consequence, if k =1and ρ>1.36 (recall that ρ is the measure of
constant absolute risk aversion) there is no b m such that R(b m)=0 , that is, such
that EU − ED(b m)=0 . It is an empirical matter whether or not absolute risk
aversion of 1.36 is reasonable, but in any case whatever is the level of absolute
risk aversion required, one can always ﬁnd a value of k such that R(m) > 0 for
all m.
Figure 2 shows two graphs of EU − ED(m):t h eﬁrst one (plotted towards
the bottom of the ﬁgure) for k =1and ρ =1 ,a n dt h eo t h e ro n ef o rk =1and
ρ =2 :









As can be seen, in the ﬁrst case EU − ED(m) is positive for small values
of m and negative for larger ones, and so for k = ρ =1there does exist an
b m. On the other hand, for k =1and ρ =2(the top graph), we can see that
EU − ED(m) > 0 for all values of compensation m. In this case, there is no
compensation that ever works to equate the two utility levels.
3C o n c l u s i o n
In this note we have considered the validity of the Crainich and Eeckhoudt mea-
sure for the intensity of downside risk aversion. We ﬁnd that the method used
by Crainich and Eeckhoudt for developing their measure cannot be guaranteed
to work generally. We have found a concrete example, using constant absolute
risk aversion, for which there is no possible compensation that makes the deci-
sion maker indiﬀerent between having the zero-mean risk on the downside and
monetary compensation on the upside, and having the zero-mean risk on the
upside. Of course, if the required compensation were not to exist, it is not
9possible to study how it is aﬀected by the shape of the utility function.
References
[1] Crainich, D. and L. Eeckhoudt (2007), “On the Intensity of Downside Risk
Aversion”, Journal of Risk and Uncertainty, 36; 267-76.
[2] Keenan, D. and A. Snow (2009), “Greater Downside Risk Aversion in the
Large”, Journal of Economic Theory, 144; 1092-1101.
[3] Menezes, C., C. Geiss and J. Tressler (1980), “Increasing Downside Risk”,
American Economic Review, 70; 921-32.
[4] Modica, S. and M. Scarsini (2005), “A Note on Comparative Downside Risk
Aversion”, Journal of Economic Theory, 122; 267-71.
10